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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUBIOUS INTRUSIONS-
PEYOTE, DRUG LAWS, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
John T. Doyle
On December 12, 1973, Roland Soto was driving an automobile
through Tualatin, Oregon, when he was stopped by a deputy
sheriff for a driver's license check. His license was found to be
suspended and Soto was arrested and searched. Two small pieces
of the peyote cactus were discovered. Soto was charged with
knowingly and unlawfully possessing peyote.'
At his trial the defendant sought to offer evidence that he was,
and had been for six years, a practicing member of the Native
American Church (NAC), that peyote was an integral part of the
church's religious ceremonies, that the peyote button in his
possession on December 12 was sacred and carried only for its
religious importance, and that he entertained a good faith belief
and practice in the ways of the NAC. 2 The offer was refused and
the defendant was convicted. The conviction was affirmed on ap-
peal in State v. Soto.3
The Soto case identifies Oregon as one of the most restrictive
jurisdictions in the country and provides a classic example of the
difficulties encountered in basing an exemption to a criminal
statute on the free exercise clause of the first amendment.4 Several
issues inevitably arise in the first amendment area. Can otherwise
criminal activity be excused because it is claimed to be a religious
practice? If so, what are the limits of such an exemption? Should
the issue be approached from the other direction, with the ques-
tion being: what are the limits of state intervention? When may the
state intervene and to what extent? Can a useful definition of
religion or religious practice be developed? If not, how do we
distinguish a claim based on religion from one merely using
religion as a shield? Does the first amendment offer protection
1. State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 798-99, 537 P.2d 142, 144 (1975). The relevant
statutes are OR. REv. STAT. § 167.207 and § 475.010(1)(b), repealed and replaced in 1977
when Oregon adopted the Uniform Drug Act. See OR. Rev. STAT. § 475.015(a) and §
475.992 (1979), and 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (11-12) (1976).
2. State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142, 144-45 (1975).
3. See sources at note 1 supra.
4. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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only for familiar, conventional religions and religious practices?
Are Native American beliefs and practices at a disadvantage?
As is normally the situation in constitutional law, case law pro-
vides the source of operative standards in this area. In examining
the issues just mentioned, it is useful to begin with a review of
United States Supreme Court cases.
A key dichotomy in free exercise analysis was established in
1872 in the case of Reynolds v. United States. The defendant in
Reynolds was charged with bigamy, a crime in the Utah Territory
by act of Congress. Reynolds argued that he was a member of the
Mormon Church, was following a religious doctrine of the
church, and consequently was entitled to protection under the
first amendment. The Supreme Court rejected his argument, say-
ing: "[flaws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinion, they
may with practices." 6
The case of Davis v. Beason,7 also involving bigamy and
members of the Mormon Church, added specificity to this
review:
It was never intended or supposed that the [first] amendment
could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the
punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and
morals of society. . . .However free the exercise of religion
may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general
consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation.'
This approach was reinforced many years later in Cantwell v.
Connecticut.9 The Cantwell case involved attempts by govern-
ment authorities to control solicitation activities of Jehovah's
Witnesses. Although deciding to protect the solicitation activities,
the Court noted that:
the Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
5. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
6. Id. at 166.
7. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Davis is virtually all dicta, but it nevertheless accurately
describes the law.
8. Id. at 342-43.




must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement
of that protection."°
However, the Court went on to say that "the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, un-
duly to infringe the protected freedom.""
Five years later the Court Was more precise about the kind of
analysis required. In Thomas v. Collins2 the Court declared that
"the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispen-
sable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment."' 3
Thus a balancing test is required, weighing individual freedom
against state power.
Considerable authority supports the notion that in order for
the state interest to prevail the transgression must be substantial.
Thomas states that "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' 4 More
recently Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Sherbert v.
Verner,' I reviewed previous occasions in which religious practices
were regulated and concluded that "[t1he conduct or actions so
regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order."' 6 A rational relation betwteen the regula-
tion and the activity to be regulated is not sufficient.17
As Chief Justice Burger wrote in 1972 in the case of Wisconsin
v. Yoder,'8 "The essence of all that has been said and written on
10. Id. at 303-304.
11. Id. at 304.
12. 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (restraint of union organizer's free speech rights un-
justifiable).
13. Id. at 529-30.
14. Id. at 530.
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. Id. at 403. Justice Brennan specifically cited Reynolds, 98 U.S. (1878); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state regulation requiring smallpox vaccination
upheld); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (state regulation upheld in conflict
between child labor laws and religious solicitation requirement); Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (Mann Act prohibition on transport of women across state
lines for immoral purposes held to apply to religious polygamy).
17. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530. See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943): "The right of a state to regulate, for example, a public utility may
well include . . . power to impose all the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'ra-
tional basis' for adopting. But freedom . . . of worship may not be infringed on such
slender grounds .... [It is] susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect. . .
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1980]
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the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion." ' 19
Thus two fundamental doctrines emerge. First, regulation of
religious belief is prohibited. Second, regulation of religious prac-
tice is possible, but only after one balances the importance of
religious liberty against the importance of state regulation of an
activity. Only the highest interests of society may overcome
religious freedom and only by the least intrusive means.
Crucial issues remain, however. What constitutes a religious
belief? Quite obviously the protection is only as broad as the
definition. Equally obviously, legislative or judicial attempts to
define religion are virtually per se violations of the establishment
clause.2 0 Also, what constitutes a religious practice? Again, the
importance of the definition is profound. Finally, who deter-
mines what the "highest interests" of society are?
To explore these issues in the context of Native American
religious beliefs and practices, it is necessary to consider (1) what
a first amendment defendant has normally been required to
show, and (2) how various jurisdictions have handled cases
similar to Soto.
What must be shown when challenging a state restriction on
the strength of the free exercise clause? First, one must show that
the regulation "imposes a burden on the free exercise of
religion." 2 ' Second, the plaintiff must show, not the truth of the
religious precepts themselves, but his or her good faith and belief
in those precepts. This requirement deserves more detailed ex-
amination.
19. Id. at 215. Of course, one can only speculate as to what the Chief Justice means
by "legitimate."
20. See Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion " in the Law, 73 YALE
L.J. 593, 604, (1964): "Yet to define the limits of religious expression may be impossible
if philosophically desirable. Moreover, any definition of religion would seem to violate
religious freedom in that it would dictate to religions, present and future, what they must
be: inability to give an authoritative definition is justified by the conjunction of the first
amendment's two religious clauses. Read together, they define religious freedom but do
not establish religion as a defined domain. That is, religious freedom is served by allowing
a completely open realm for defining religion rather than by establishing a domain or
definition in which religions can freely operate. Furthermore, an attempt to define
religion, even for purposes of increasing freedom for religions, would run afoul of the
'establishment' clause, as excluding some religions, or even as establishing a notion
respecting religion."




In United States v. Ballard,22 a case that arose in the 1940s,
proponents of the "I Am" movement were convicted for using
the mails to defraud. At trial the judge asked the jury to decide
whether the defendants "honestly and in good faith" believed the
religious representations they had made to others. 23 The circuit
court reversed, saying the truth of the representations should also
have been submitted to the jury." The Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court, approving the trial judge's approach and
holding that the jury could not pass upon the truth of defen-
dants' claims: "Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution.
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to
the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs." 25
Justice Jackson dissented, believing that even the majority's
approach was too intrusive. He argued first that:
[Als a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not see how
we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considera-
tions as to what is believeable. The most convincing proof that
one believes his statements is to show that they have been true
in his experience. Likewise, that one knowingly falsified is best
proved by showing that what he said happened never did hap-
pen. How can the Government prove these persons knew
something to be false which it cannot prove to be false? If we
try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate
the dispute from the very considerations which in common ex-
perience provide its most reliable answer.26
Second, he argued that a jury will not find a defendant honest-
ly believed something the jury itself finds unbelievable." He con-
cluded by pointing out the inevitable frustrations of protecting
freedom of religion. Great restraint is required to keep from
restricting or prohibiting that which is thought to be incredible or
dangerous: "[T]he price of freedom of religion or of speech or of
press is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal
of rubbish." 8
Justice Jackson urged that the indictment be dismissed and
that the Court "have done with this business of judicially examin-
22. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
23. Id. at 81.
24. Id. at 83.
25. Id. at 86.
26. Id. at 92-93.
27. Id. at 93.
28. Id. at 95.
1980]
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ing other people's faiths."29 His concerns have received little
judicial credence. The plaintiff is still required to show his good
faith belief.
Before reaching the so-called peyote cases, a number of cases
warrant discussion because they help to outline the context in
which Native American religious freedom cases are often con-
sidered. In 1972 three Pawnee children were suspended from an
Oklahoma public school for wearing long braided hair in viola-
tion of the school dress code.3" The children sought injunctive
relief in federal court, arguing, among other claims, that the hair
regulation violated their free exercise rights. Their claim was
dismissed in New Rider v. Board of Education3' for lack of a
"substantial Constitutional question cognizable in the federal
courts."
3 2
A concurring opinion by the Chief Justice explains the
dismissal:
The Pawnee are near-pantheists, their every act having
religious significance in their basic desire to live in harmony
with the Universe. Hair styles ... have traditional but variable
significance to the Pawnee according to the trend of modern
custom or a desire to renew or popularize the style of their
forefathers.33
The same circuit reached the same result again a year later in
Hatch v. Goerke,34 a similar case involving an Arapaho student.
In both these cases the plaintiffs apparently failed to convince the
court that a substantial burden had been placed on a religious
practice. In essence the court saw only a secular, not a religious,
issue.
Interestingly enough, just a few years earlier a comparable
issue had come before the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder": that is, how can we separate true religious beliefs or
practices from "mere" life-style? Chief Justice Burger's struggle
is worth reprinting:
29. Id.
30. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S.
1097 (1973).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 695.
33. Id. at 700.
34. 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974).




In evaluating those claims we must be careful to determine
whether the Amish religious faith and their modes of life are,
as they claim, inseparable and interdependent. A way of life,
however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based
on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the
Religious Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief.16
The Court, although obviously uncomfortable with a situation
where religious values could not be separated from everyday life,
found enough of the familiar to overcome the state interest in
education on religious grounds. An organized religious group was
involved whose "deep religious convictions" were based on the
Bible." The Yoder plaintiffs were allowed to take their children
out of school at age 14 instead of the statutorily required age 16.
No such religious respect was shown the plaintiffs in New
Rider and Hatch. The integration of religion with life-style
creates more intense definitional difficulties when the court has
nothing familiar to which it can relate.3" The strange and dif-
ferent simply fall outside court concepts of the religious. As one
well-known commentator points out: "[T]he struggle to
categorize neatly what Indians are moved to do by their traditions
... illustrates the difficulty our legal system has in applying con-
stitutional protections to a strange culture's value system and
spiritual life." '39
Nevertheless, the same year Hatch was decided, a different
federal court reached a very different result in an analogous situa-
tion. In Teterud v. Gillman"0 the request of a Cree inmate of the
Iowa State Penitentiary to wear long braided hair was denied by
the warden. Teterud appealed the decision to the federal district
court and the warden's decision was reversed. The court found
that hair length was a "tenet of the Indian religion,"'" that
Teterud's religious beliefs were sincere," that the hair regulation
36. Id. at 215.
37. Id.
38. See V. DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 82 (1973).
39. D. GEhTCHES, D. ROSENFELT, C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 507-508 (1979).
40. 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
41. Id. at 156.
42. Id. at 157. The court's test was not strict. The evidence was viewed as contradic-
tory and Teterud's attitude was seen as being "of very recent vintage." Yet defendants
failed to show that Teterud's beliefs were not "in good faith." Id.
1980]
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was "unnecessarily broad in its sweep," ' 43 and that there were
"viable alternatives capable of protecting th6 particular govern-
mental interest involved" 4 without infringing on the plaintiff's
free exercise rights. Consequently the hair regulation was held un-
constitutional.
In doing so the court explicitly rejected the result in New
Rider.45 The defendants appealed but were unsuccessful." The
circuit court rebuffed appellant's argument that long hair must be
shown to be "an absolute tenet of the Indian religion practiced
by all Indians." '4 7 The court held that "[p]roof that the practice is
deeply rooted in religious belief is sufficient." ' 48 The court also
spoke to the state interest involved: "Justifications founded only
on fear and apprehension are insufficient to overcome rights
asserted under the First Amendment. ' 49
Thus the Teterud cases indicate that (1) beliefs need to be
"deep rooted" but not "absolute"; (2) sincerity need only be
asserted, not proved beyond contradiction;5" (3) regulations must
not sweep so broadly that religious freedoms are unnecessarily
compromised; and (4) viable regulatory alternatives that do not
infringe on religious liberties must be pursued when they exist.
These cases form a basis for a consideration of the use of
the religious freedom defense by Native Americans charged with
violating state drug control laws. The dispute over a religious
freedom defense goes back many years, as shown by the early
case of State v. Big Sheep."' Big Sheep, a Crow, was arrested in
November, 1924, for possessing peyote. He protested that he was
a member of the Native American Church (NAC) and that his
possession was related to his religion and therefore protected by
Montana constitutional guarantees of free exercise of religion.
Although the case was remanded on a jurisdictional issue, the
court stated that the issue of conflict between free exercise and
43. Id. at 159.
44. Id.
45. The court also rejected the result in Goings v. Aaron, 350 F. Supp. I (D. Minn.
1972) (court rebuffed habeas corpus action by penitentiary inmate who had been placed in
isolation for religiously based noncompliance with penitentiary hair regulation).
46. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 360.
48. Id. The court did not address the obvious racism of requiring a showing that all
Indians hold long hair as an absolute regligious tenet.
49. Id. at 361-62.
50. See note 42 supra.




state order, peace, and safety-was for the legislature to decide
under Montana's constitution.5 1
The next case of note was the landmark case in this area of
law. The 1964 case of People v. Woody53 has had a dramatic im-
pact. In Woody the California Supreme Court was presented with
a religious defense to the arrest of NAC members for using
peyote. The defendants were arrested during a police raid on a
hogan in the desert near Needles, California.
The case was decided by employing a balancing test. The court
framed the issue as a conflict between the exercise of a highly
regarded constitutional right, freedom of religion, and the en-
forcement of narcotics laws, considered to be a "compelling state
interest." Refusing to recognize a presumption in favor of the
statute, the court declared that the state's claim could not lie in
"untested assertions." ' 4 Specifically, the state failed to show
harmful consequences to peyote users55 or excessive difficulties
enforcing the statute against nonexempt persons. 6 In addition,
the existence in other states of exemption laws for NAC members
contradicted the state's scenarios of disaster.5
In contrast, the court found that the weight on the side of
religious freedom was substantial because the practice involved
was fundamental to the NAC .5 The court also recognized that:
[T]he right to free religious expression embodies a precious
heritage of our history. In a mass society, which presses at
every point toward conformity, the protection of a self expres-
sion, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes
ever more important. The varying currents of the subcultures
that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth
and beauty. 9
The result was heartening for those concerned with protecting
the free exercise rights of Native Americans in general and
members of the NAC in particular. Also encouraging in Woody
was the court's avoidance of a potentially major pitfall. The
court assumed that a religion was involved. Nowhere in the opin-
52. Id. at 238-39, 243 P. at 1073.
53. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
54. Id. at 724, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75, 394 P.2d at 819.
55. Id. at 722-23, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 394 P.2d at 818.
56. Id. at 727, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77, 394 P.2d at 821.
57. Id. at 723-24, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75, 394 P.2d at 819.
58. Id. at 727, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77, 394 P.2d at 821.
59. Id.
19801
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ion did the court review facts and decide that a religion was in-
volved.
However, the Woody court did commit some important errors.
In analyzing the case the court sought to determine whether the
criminal statute imposed any burdens on the free exercise of
religion. As noted above, this showing is commonly required. Yet
the inquiry that resulted included a thorough history of the NAC
and its predecessors, how long it had been in existence, how
many members it had, what the nature of its teachings and beliefs
were, how peyote is viewed and used, and how its practices com-
pare with Christian practices. 60 The court concluded that peyote
is the essence of the religion. 61
This process is disturbing for two reasons. First, whether in-
tended or not, the description of peyotism, with its references to
a long history, many members, and Christian parallels, reads like
a litany of what the court considers to be religious characteristics.
The court seems to say, "You can tell by all these characteristics
that this really is a religion. We simply haven't noticed it before."
It is a subtle way of gaining support for what the court probably
felt would be viewed as a radical result.
Second, the court, in probing the burden, seeks to show that
peyote is indeed used religiously. Admittedly it is more conven-
ient to show that a religious practice is being inhibited by first
showing what the practice is, but Woody goes beyond that.
Woody seeks to show that this is indeed a religious practice by
pointing to accoutrements common in conventional religions. In
fact, Woody declares the use of peyote is a religious practice in
this context.62 This is precisely the kind of interference the first
amendment establishment clause sought to avoid.
Equally unfortunate, the court leaves the impression that the
peyote use has priority over only the statute because the use is the
"theological heart ' 63 of the religion. As Teterud has since
shown, this is not the correct legal standard. If it is, then govern-
ment is given license to determine what is important to a religion
and what is not, with the result .that certain practices are ap-
proved, others are prohibited, and free exercise is hopelessly com-
promised.
Woody should therefore be respected for its unusually clear
60. Id. at 720-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-74, 394 P.2d at 816-18.
61. Id. at 727, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77, 394 P.2d at 821.
62. Id. at 720-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74, 394 P.2d at 817-18.




and forthright discussion of its balancing process, its ability to
avoid defining religion, and its willingness to probe governmental
assertions of "compelling interest." Woody should not, however,
be regarded as authority that only central, essential religious prac--
tices can hope to avoid state regulation. Nor should Woody's ner-
vous listing of conventional religious characteristics serve as a
guide. Finally, the approach in Woody of conferring recognition
on a particular practice as essential to the religion as a whole
should be avoided lest the court become a certification boaid for
religions and religious practices.
Some of the inadequacies of Woody revealed themselves im-
mediately. The same day the California Supreme Court decided
Woody, it also decided In re Grady." Grady had been imprison-
ed for possessing peyote and petitioned the court for a writ of
habeas corpus. Grady made no showing of any connection with
an organized religion. He did, however, assert that his use of
peyote was religious. The court accepted this assertion but found
that a factual issue remained as to whether Grady "actually
engaged in good faith in the practice of a religion."
65
This is the issue decided over Justice Jackson's dissent in
United States v. Ballard." Woody followed the lead of the
Ballard majority. The potential for abuse under this approach is
clearly exposed in Grady. The court seeks to probe the belief and
life-style of Grady in order to determine if he is sincere enough to
be granted recognition by the court. His task is difficult. He has
no organized, familiar church he can utilize to "prove" his
sincerity. He is engaging in activity viewed as very suspicious, if
not criminal, by the government.
Grady's situation is not unique. A federal court muddled
through the area in the renowned case of Leary v. United
States.67 Timothy Leary was charged with violating laws control-
ling the use of marijuana and other psychedelic drugs. The court,
in language that would be echoed several years later in New
Rider, complained that Leary drew "no distinction between his
religious beliefs and his scientific experimentation." 68 Once
again, a court was uncomfortable with integrated life-styles, with
acts done for more than one purpose.
64. 61 Cal. 2d 887, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 394 P.2d 728 (1964).
65. Id. at 888, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 913, 394 P.2d at 729.
66. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
67. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), reh. denied, 392 F.2d 220 (1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
68. Id. at 857.
19801
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Despite testimony that marijuana played an important part in
the rituals of the Hindu sect with which Leary was associated,69
the court found "no evidence in this case that the use of mari-
juana is a formal requisite of the practice of Hinduism. '" ' As
noted above in the Teterud discussion, this cannot be the proper
test, but the Fifth Circuit employed it in 1967. Indeed, the court
also used it to distinguish Woody, claiming that the Woody stan-
dard required the practice to be central to the religion.7 Thus
Woody's overstatement allowed the court to evade the issue in
Leary.
Finally, in a disingenuous balancing procedure, in Leary, the
court purported to weigh the competing interests of religious free-
dom and governmental regulation. The court ignored the special
nature and status of free exercise claims and instead concentrated
on "the broad power to legislate vested in Congress by the Con-
stitution.""2 Having given short shrift to the importance of the
practice in Leary's religion, the court laid out the horrors of
marijuana: "It would be difficult to imagine the harm which
would result if the criminal statutes against marijuana were
nullified as to those who claim the right to possess ... this drug
for religious purposes. . . . The danger is too great, especially to
the youth of the nation . . . -"I In the words of Woody, these
are merely "untested assertions" that do not justify inhibition of
religious freedom.
Leary was followed a year later by another federal court case,
United States v. Kuch.74 In Kuch the defendant, charged with
violating certain laws pertaining to LSD and marijuana, asserted
she was an ordained minister of the Neo-American Church. She
did not give "subjective evidence as to her personal beliefs," but
rather chose to rely on her church position and church doctrine.75
The court rejected the defendant's use of the first amendment as
a shield, arguing that the church and its members lacked "any
common religious concern . . . [or] . . . any solid evidence of a
belief in a supreme being, a religious discipline, a ritual or tenets
69. Id.
70. Id. at 860.
71. Id. at 861.
72. Id. at 859 n.9, referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
73. Id. at 861.
74. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). See also State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148
S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967) (unlawful possession of marijuana
and peyote by Neo-American Church member; conviction upheld).




to guide one's daily existence." 76 The group was formed, said tle
court, merely to use and enjoy drugs.7" Its principles were
"agnostic,"7 8 and the entire scheme was designed to mock
established institutions. 9
Admittedly, the church in Kuch, with its members called "Boo
Hoos," 8 ° its theme song of "Puff, the Magic Dragon," 8' and its
motto of "Victory over Horseshit," 82 is less than reverent, but
this does not justify a judicial overreaction that dispenses with
the constitutional guarantee of free exercise. The court assumed
that no religion or religious beliefs are involved. Yet certainly con-
siderable religious feeling is encompassed in the church's dissent
against traditional religious institutions. The presence of abun-
dant sarcasm is only an issue of style. Surely the right to practice
agnosticism is protected by the free exercise clause. Equally clear-
ly, a position based on opposition to established religion is not
necessarily a-religious. Nor is an unsolidified religious attitude
any less noteworthy, constitutionally, than the Summa
Theologica of Thomas Aquinas. In any event, a broad concept of
religious freedom includes what some might wish to call "no
religion."
The court in Kuch was offended. It reacted unfortunately,
seeking to crush the dissent, and thereby did a grave disservice to
the very religious pluralism it professed to honor.
Particularly disturbing in Kuch is the court's recital of the fac-
tors found lacking in the Neo-American Church. Rituals, tenets,
disciplines, and supreme beings do not exhaust the components
of a possible religion. In theory, a religion can be a religion of
nothing, or beyond. Judge Gesell's narrow-minded definition
asserts there are absolutes in religion, certain mental structures
and no others. He has missed the entire point of the first amend-
ment.
The failure of Woody to influence either Kuch or Leary is an
unfortunate indication of its limited applicability. Woody only
seems capable of strong guidance in cases directly involving
peyote and members of the NAC. A case in point is State v.
76. Id. at 444.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 445.
79. Id. at 444.
80. Id. at 443.
81. Id. at 444.
82. Id. at 445.
1980]
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Whittingham.8 3 In this case the Arizona Court of Appeals fol-
lowed Woody in exempting peyote-using members of the NAC
from prosecution under Arizona drug laws. The court, like the
court in Woody, recognized the priority position of free exercise
claims and looked to ascertain the importance of the state's in-
terest. Because the evidence showed that "peyote is not a narcotic
substance and is not habit-forming," no compelling interest ex-
isted sufficient to justify inhibition of defendants' free exercise of
religion.84
However, in 1974, the California case of Golden Eagle v.
Johnson85 again exposed the shortcomings of Woody. The plain-
tiff in Golden Eagle was arrested for possession of peyote.
Despite statements to arresting officers that he was an NAC
member, he was imprisoned for 31 days pending a hearing on his
good faith belief. Under the Woody scheme, good faith is ascer-
tained on a case-by-case basis. Thus any NAC members who
practice their religion are subject to indeterminate prison terms.
Golden Eagle sought to have a hearing on good faith inserted
into the procedures before arrest. This idea suffers, however,
from difficulties involved in compelling a hearing before a would-
be defendant is taken into custody. The practical solution would
seem to be the abandonment of peyote prosecutions in general. 6
As Woody and Whittingham both noted, society is not
significantly endangered, if at all, by peyote's use.
After Golden Eagle came the Oregon decision in State v.
Soto," in which the conviction of the defendant for possessing
peyote was affirmed by a 2-1 vote. The majority avoided the
heart of the matter by framing the issues prejudicially. Like the
court in Leary, the Soto majority concentrated not on the es-
teemed position of free exercise rights but rather on the alleged
broad sweep of legislative police power. The court in fact created
a presumption in favor of the legislature. 8 This was done despite
the principles identified earlier in Thomas v. Collins89 to the ef-
fect that in first amendment situations no presumption exists on
83. 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973).
84. Id. at 30, 504 P.2d at 953.
85. 493 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
86. This could be done either through (1) exercising police and prosecutorial discre-
tion in not arresting or prosecuting peyote users, or (2) declaring the law controlling
peyote to be unconstitutional.
87. See 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975).
88. Id. at 798, 537 P.2d at 144.




the side of legislation. The court quotes Thomas but overlooks
this key aspect of that case.9"
Curiously, the court seeks to support its ruling by citations to
City of Portland v. Thornton9 and Baer v. City of Bend.92 Both
involved regulations implemented to promote the health of
children. 93 The peyote laws are aimed at a far vaster audience, in-
cluding all age groups. Thornton and Baer are only tangentially
related, if at all, to the situation in Soto. On the basis of these in-
adequate authorities, and without mentioning Woody or Whit-
tingham, the court affirmed Soto's conviction.
It is likely that part of the court's resistance can be explained
by the nature of the particular religious practices at issue. The use
of peyote lacks any clear, or at least any acknowledged, counter-
part in conventional American religions. Kathleen McLaughlin
has observed a
desire for transformative ecstatic experience which has either
been ignored, rejected or relegated to third or fourth place by
traditional church organizations in this country. Churches have
tended to focus more on doctrine or on ethical behavior and
community service rather than on the individual's interior ex-
perience of the divine presence. 4
In short, the Western compulsion for rational, scientific process
and thought has extended into c6ncepts of what is properly
religious, denying the validity of altered states of consciousness
and the means, such as ingesting peyote, of achieving them. 9
Judge Fort wrote a lengthy dissent in Soto," tracing the
Supreme Court standards on freedom of religion and quoting ex-
tensively from Woody and Whittingham. He took special issue
with the majority's presumption in favor of the legislative
measure.
97
90. State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 797, 537 P.2d 142, 143 (1975).
91. 174 Or. 508, 149 P.2d 972, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 770 (1944).
92. 206 Or. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956).
93. Thornton concerned solicitation by a nine-year-old girl on behalf of Jehovah's
Witnesses' periodicals in violation of a regulation prohibiting employment of children so
young. Baer was concerned with a fluoridation law passed "for the purpose of reducing
dental caries, that is, decay of the teeth, among children." Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Or.
at 223, 292 P.2d at 135.
94. Address by Dr. Kathleen McLaughlin, Lewis and Clark College Winter Forum
Series: "The Challenge of the Cults" (Mar. 3, 1980).
95. See A. WEIL, THE NATuRAL MIND (1972).
96. 21 Or. App. 794, 798-806, 537 P.2d 142, 144-47 (1975).
97. Id. at 805-806, 537 P.2d at 147.
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Although his argument is persuasive and legally superior to the
majority's, Judge Fort uses certain suspect arguments-suspect,
that is, from a broader view of first amendment principles. First,
he limits his advocacy to members of the NAC only. For pur-
poses of deciding the case, this is, of course, legally proper. In
terms of constitutional justification, however, as has been men-
tioned above, it is ultimately dangerous and incorrect. The NAC
becomes a recognized state religion in violation of the establish-
ment clause.
Second, Fort, like the Woody and Whittingham judges before
him, seeks to buttress his exemption for NAC peyote users with
federal regulations and state statute exemptions for the NAC.9
This only gives support to the establishment clause issue just
mentioned.
Finally, Fort is not able to dispense with the need for a show-
ing of good faith by the defendant. As long as such a showing is
required, free exercise will be frustrated by the task of making
nonbelievers believe that which is to them unbelievable.
Two years after Sota, in 1977, Oklahoma came to the opposite
conclusion in a very similar case. In Whitehorn v. State9 the
defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended driver's
license. When he was searched, peyote was discovered. He was
convicted of unlawful possession.
The appellate court reversed, finding that Whitehorn was a
member of the NAC and entitled to exemption from criminal
statutes. The court reasoned that his use of peyote did not
subvert a compelling state interest.
Although not requiring them, the court suggested that
membership lists and cards would ease enforcement difficulties
for the state.'10 This frightening suggestion is the logical result of
extending constitutional protection to NAC members only.
The court's ruling under the facts extended to carrying peyote
as well as ingesting it. One law review article'"' makes much of
this, and perhaps it should. It certainly makes the Oregon court's
approach in Soto that much less tenable. However, we are still
laboring in a framework that allows religious freedom only to
98. Id. at 803, 537 P.2d at 146.
99. 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Cr. 1977).
100. Id. at 546, 548.
101. Note, Constitutional Law: Whitehorn v. State: Peyote and Religious Freedom in




members of an old, populous, established religion with at least
partially familiar origins.
That even the present changes have occurred is quite
remarkable, and belittlement of the advances is not intended. The
dangers of the current approach, however, are substantial.
Woody and its progeny threaten to be only dead end, effective
only for very limited fact situations but frustrating, and even pro-
hibiting, additional gains. This is disturbing because the par-
ticular issues addressed here are not the only current issues that
impact Native American religious practice. Other issues with
religious implications include land claims,' 0 2 hunting practices,'1 3
and control of sacred objects.' 4
The cultural context for further progress is not propitious. This
has, of course, often been the case in the past. Supreme Court
Justice Brewer baldly asserted in 1892 that "this is a Christian na-
tion."' 0 The same is true today. Understanding and respect for
native religions is warped by this orientation and serves to vitiate
constitutional protections: "[N]on-Indians can comprehend wor-
ship in a church or synagogue, but not on a mountaintop or with
an eagle feather." 06
Such attitudes, along with the seemingly intense need to
separate religion from cultural traditions and daily life, do not
herald increased respect for Indian beliefs. Nor do narrow case
decisions gaining limited freedom for a particular class of In-
dians.
Taken together, present attitudes and legal standards constitute
a distortion of first amendment religious liberties. They combine
to support interventions in religious life and freedom. Countering
and reversing these interventions will require more complete
dedication to constitutional religious freedom than has been
demonstrated to date.
Freedom of religion is more than just a legal guideline. As a
nation we have proclaimed it to be basic to our way of life. But
ideals have faded into rhetoric. It is time to hearken back to
Justice Jackson and have done with this business of examining
102. This is true for claims involving Pyramid Lake, Blue Lake, and the Black Hills,
among others.
103. This is true for the fishing rights controversy in the Pacific Northwest.
104. See Blair, American Indians vs. American Museums: A Matter of Religous
Freedom, 5 AM. IND. J. 13 (May 1979).
105. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
106. Harris, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act and Its Promise, 5 AM.
IND. J. 7 (June 1979).
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other people's faiths. It is time to recognize that "priority gives
[religious] liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the
limitation, which determines what standard governs the
choice""
107. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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